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Abstract 
Purpose - The aim of this paper is to investigate China’s attitude towards adopting western 
accounting practices. In particular, its response to the expansion of western professional 
accounting bodies into China will be studied. 
Design/methodology/approach - The paper draws on the theoretical framework of new 
institutional sociology (NIS) and legitimacy theory to disentangle the symbolic from the 
substantive in respect of what government, accounting institutions and ‘actors’ say and the 
strategies they employ. Data are collected using semi-structured in-depth interviews and 
qualitative document analysis.  
Findings - The study reveals a strong coercive influence of western institutional networks 
(such as the western professional accounting bodies, the Big 4, multinational enterprises, the 
World Bank, the IASB, the IMF, and the WTO) on China, and China’s limited power to control 
these institutions. The authors find the intrusion of the western accounting institutions has been 
seen as a threat to China’s information secrecy and national security. As a result, there are signs 
of a push-back against the operations of the international accounting organisations in the 
Chinese market.   
Research limitations/implications – China’s participation in the areas investigated in this 
paper would promote the further globalisation of accounting, while China’s resistance may 
come about because China feels its voice in international organisations, professions, and 
accounting education is being undervalued. The extent of China’s participation or resistance 
will be of great significance for the future of accounting globalisation.  
Originality/value - It is against a background of China’s growing assertiveness that the 
research was undertaken and this study is, arguably, therefore able to make a contribution to the 
history of the Anglo-Saxon accounting profession and its move into overseas countries. The 
paper also makes a contribution to knowledge through the application of NIS theory to the field 
of the accounting profession.  
Keywords Professionalisation, Accounting Profession, Globalisation of Accounting, China, 
Convergence, IFRS, New Institutional Sociology, Legitimacy Theory. 
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1. Introduction 
The first professional accounting body in the world was established in the United 
Kingdom in 1853 (Lee, 1995). Since then, Anglo-Saxon accounting institutions have 
been dominating the accounting field. Leicht and Fennell (2008) draw attention to the 
change within the accounting profession as a result of the growing importance of the 
institutional environment. Many researchers have highlighted the embeddedness of 
international institutions such as the western professional accounting bodies, the big 
accounting firms (the Big 4), multinational enterprises (MNEs), the World Bank, the 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in the globalisation of accounting 
(Albu, Albu, Bunea, Calu, & Girbina, 2011; Leicht & Fennell, 2008; Samuel, 2006). It 
is argued that these institutions dominate the adoption of the International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS) in developing countries, which could be regarded as a 
form of accounting colonialism (Larson, 1997; Saudagaran, 2004; Sikka, 2001). Within 
such an institutional context, the western professional accounting bodies made their 
move to overseas markets, in particular to emerging Asian markets such as China, 
because the growth of their domestic markets reached maximum levels. This paper 
investigates China’s attitude towards adopting western accounting practices with a 
particular focus on how China responds to the expansion of western professional 
accounting bodies. For this research, western accounting practices refer to the 
convergence of Chinese accounting standards with western accounting standards, i.e. 
IFRS, and the collaborations with western professional accounting bodies in aspects of 
training domestic accountants, mutual recognition, assessment of skills and 
competency in professional examinations and so forth.  
China is a growing world power with possibly the world’s largest economy in the future 
(Peng & Bewley, 2010), and how the country operates in this accounting field will have 
ramifications for the rest of the world. On one hand, China’s accounting standard 
setters issued the new Chinese generally accepted accounting practices (the Chinese 
GAAP), which took effect from 1st January 2007. The new Chinese GAAP is the first to 
claim substantial convergence with IFRS (IASB, 2006; Peng & Bewley, 2010; Tweedie, 
2006). On the other hand, China may resist globalisation because it feels its voice in 
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international organisations, professional accounting bodies, and accounting education 
is being undervalued. The extent of China’s participation or resistance will be of great 
future significance for the ideal of accounting globalisation. This paper employs new 
institutional sociology and legitimacy theory to disentangle the symbolic from the 
substantive in respect of what the Chinese government, accounting institutions and 
‘actors’ say and the strategies they employ. To pursue its research objectives, the study 
is organised to address the following two interrelated research questions:  
RQ1. Whether the welcome by China to the international institutions is an 
isomorphic response to exogenous pressures? If yes, what form/s of isomorphic 
influence are observed and how do these influences happen? 
RQ2. To what extent are China’s legitimising strategies employed in adopting 
western accounting practices symbolic or substantive? Whether participation and/or 
resistance can be observed? 
Both of the two research questions are addressed through in-depth interviews and 
review of empirical evidence from various qualitative documents such as official 
reports, government policies and regulations, and media.  
The structure of this paper is outlined below. Section 2 provides the background setting 
of the study and reviews relevant prior literature and theory. This is followed by a 
description of research design in section 3. Section 4 discusses key findings and it is 
followed by section 5 that concludes the study.  
2. Background and prior research 
This section provides background of the accounting profession in China. It also reviews 
the existing literature relevant to the scope of this study and explains the theory 
employed for this study.  
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2.1 Accounting Profession in China 
The development of the accounting profession in mainland China is unique. Since the 
economic reforms of 1978 and to cope with the increasing demands of economic 
growth, the Chinese accounting profession has gone through a series of major changes 
and established its own professional accounting body – Chinese Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants (CICPA) in 1988 (CICPA, 2013; Hao, 1999). Some major 
milestones of the development of the accounting profession in China is shown in Table 
1. The CICPA is a very young professional accounting body compared with the 
Anglo-Saxon professional accounting bodies such as the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants of England and Wales (ICAEW) (founded in 1880), CPA Australia 
(founded in 1886), the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) 
(founded in 1887), and the Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA) 
(founded in 1904). It is also considered a weaker professional accounting body because 
the Chinese government still retains control over it (Hao, 1999; National People’s 
Congress, 1993; Yee, 2009). This weakness and lack of professional independence, 
Perera (1989) observes, often coincide with the lower professional status of Chinese 
accountants, which means it is more important that the government, in the interests of 
uniformity, protects the general society. In contrast to the more independent bodies in 
the West, the development of the accounting profession in China was and is 
government driven and organised, reflecting a strong controlling power of the 
government in the Chinese accounting profession rather than the embeddedness which 
Leicht and Fenell (2008) found among Anglo-Saxon professions, the big accounting 
firms, MNEs and the IASB in the institutional network.  
Table 1 Development of the Accounting Profession in China 
Timeline Major Changes in the Accounting Profession in China 
1918 First appeared when Mr Lin Xie became the first “certified accountant” in China 
(Li & Wang, 1989). 
Strongly influenced by western countries (Aiken & Lu, 1998; Guo, 1988; Hao, 
1999). 
1918 – 1949 Very little development due to continuous political upheaval (Hao, 1999).  
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1949 – 1978 New China was founded and the accounting system was significantly influenced 
by the Soviet model. Central planning replaced the capitalist economic 
structure, accounting profession effectively disappeared (Aiken & Lu, 1998; 
Hao, 1999).  
1966 – 1976 Worse during the Cultural Revolution, accountants were targeted for 
persecution (Bledstein, 1976). 
1978 Economic transformation started - Open up to the world. Lots of foreign direct 
investments were established in the form of Chinese-foreign (Sino-foreign) joint 
ventures (Hao, 1999; Nobes & Parker, 2008; Yee, 2009).  
1985 The Chinese government issued the Accounting Law (Hao, 1999).  
1986 The government issued CPA regulations (Hao, 1999).  
 The Chinese Institute of Certified Public Accountants (CICPA) was eventually 
established in 1988 (Hao, 1999; Kliegman, 2005; Zhang, 1997). 
1993 The first “Chinese Accounting Standards for Enterprises” came into effect 
(National People's Congress, 1993). Ministry of Finance was given the authority 
to regulate both the accounting and the auditing firms.  
1998 Chinese government “unlinked” the CPA firms from their former 
government-related sponsors, and then “restructured” CPA firms into either 
limited liability companies or partnerships (Hao, 1999, p. 297). 
 
In such an institutional environment, China, as a new power in the world, attracts a 
great deal of attention from these international institutions: for example, a huge capital 
inflow from the MNEs, the establishment of Chinese-foreign jointly owned 
(Sino-foreign) ‘Big 4’ accounting firms (Hao, 1999), as well as the entry of 
Anglo-Saxon professional accounting bodies (CICPA, 2013). When domestic markets 
have grown to maximum levels, western professional accounting bodies seek more 
memberships in overseas markets. Their main targets are emerging markets such as 
Mainland China’s. A number of western professional accounting bodies have 
proactively expanded its operation into Mainland China. The first western professional 
accounting body entered into this market was ACCA in 1988. Some other western 
professional accounting bodies have also followed ACCA to seek for opportunities of 
collaborations with the Chinese accounting profession. They are the Certified General 
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Accountants Association of Canada (CGA), the Chartered Institute of Management 
Accountants (CIMA), CPA Australia, and ICAEW (CICPA, 2013).  
The CICPA in China has established joint training programmes with the Hong Kong 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants (HKICPA), ICAEW, and CPA Australia to 
train Chinese accountants to complete western professional accounting qualifications 
(CICPA, 2010). There are also active collaborations between CICPA and western 
professional accounting bodies in areas of continuing education, mutual recognition, 
training for professional examination and so forth (CICPA, 2013). It has also been 
observed that in recent years China has welcomed the invitation to participate in 
international financial accounting bodies (CICPA, 2013). Moreover, China has moved 
to align its standards with those of the IASB (IASB, 2006; Peng & Bewley, 2010) 
[while not announcing a date for adoption].  
Anglo-Saxon accounting bodies are linked together for mutual advantage, a fact 
recognised in the literature (Albu et al., 2011; Larson, 1997; Samuel, 2006; Saudagaran, 
2004; Sikka, 2001) and, perhaps, resented by those authors outside the Anglo-Saxon 
tent. The globalisation promoted by the Anglo-Saxon institutions has engendered some 
criticism. Saudagaran (2004) considers the progress in the adoption of the IFRS to be a 
form of accounting colonialism because the accounting standards of the developed 
countries will remain in a dominant position in the process of standard-setting, 
regardless of the interests of the developing countries. The research undertaken in this 
paper is against a background of the embeddedness of the western institutional network 
and the growing assertiveness of China.  
2.2 Literature review and theoretical framework 
Two theories have been adopted for the purpose of this research: New Institutional 
Sociology (NIS) and legitimacy theory. The three forms of institutional isomorphism: 
coercive, mimetic and normative suggested by DiMaggio and Powell (1983) are 
employed in this research. The concept of isomorphism embraces the influences of the 
wider environment on the development of the accounting profession in China. As 
Aldrich (1979) argues, organisations compete not just for resources and customers, but 
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also for political power and institutional legitimacy, for social as well as economic 
fitness. The concept of institutional isomorphism is a useful tool for understanding the 
politics and ceremony that pervade much modern organisational life. Within the scope 
of this study, the first research question focuses on whether the welcome by China to 
the international institutions is an isomorphic response to exogenous pressures.  
Such welcome by China in the form of collaboration and convergence may be less real 
than it seems because, as Fogarty (1996) comments, NIS presents the paradox that what 
an organisation actually accomplishes and what its structure suggests it should 
accomplish are often quite distinct. The people, institutions and professional bodies 
involved in accounting do not always do what they say they will do. Such a dichotomy 
lies at the heart of much financial confusion, acrimony and scandal. The globalisation 
of financial reporting, auditing and the accounting profession is permeated with 
symbolism passing as substantive. Too often “form” triumphs over “substance”. The 
symbolic provides smoother pathways to collaboration while the substantive requires 
implementation, which can be controversial and difficult. Symbolism can be a much 
wider pathway than simply being defined as people not doing what they say they will 
do. Therefore, the second research question is pursued: to what extent do China’s 
strategies employed in adopting western accounting practices symbolic or substantive? 
Whether participation and/or resistance can be observed? 
Suchman (1995) draws attention to the strategic and institutional approaches to 
legitimacy, the former assuming a larger level of control by managers over the 
legitimacy process by the employment and adaptation of symbols and rituals to gain 
societal support. Researchers like Dowling and Pfeffer (1975), Pfeffer (1981), and 
Ashforth and Gibbs (1990) view legitimacy as an operational resource to be used by 
managers and individuals.  
By contrast, the institutional approach of researchers such as DiMaggio and Powell 
(1983), Meyer and Rowan (1977), Meyer and Scott (1983), and Zucker (1987) holds 
the view that legitimacy is a set of social beliefs external to institutions but generally 
binding on them. Such social beliefs relegate managerial agency, and tend to explain 
management actions as being both the products and producers of institutionalised 
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cultural frameworks. That is, society imposes its beliefs on managers through cultural 
expectations, and the distinction between the symbolic and the substantive, according 
to Suchman (1995), therefore “fades into insignificance” (p. 576). While the distinction 
between individual/management strategic and institutional approaches are an important 
consideration in the literature, this paper follows the thinking of Suchman (1995) by 
incorporating both strategic and institutional orientations. On the one hand, this paper 
accepts that managers can and do construct symbolic relationships with their 
stakeholders to engender approving legitimating perceptions. In this respect, such a 
compromise leaves intact a distinction between symbolic and substantive actions. 
However, on the other hand, this paper also accepts arguments from the literature that 
the cultural environment impacts on the freedom and objectivity of managers within 
that environment.   
Institutions and individuals to achieve legitimisation will adopt either substantive or 
symbolic strategies or some combination of both(Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990). Substantive 
actions bring about changes to outputs or changes in terms of technical processes or 
efficiency. Okike (2004) provides an exemplar of substantive change occurring when 
the Nigerian government was determined to improve the technical efficiency of the 
Nigerian audit profession. By contrast to substantive legitimising strategies, symbolic 
actions are often preferred because they avoid internal conflict over material changes 
and involve little (or none at all) implementation (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990). Moreover, 
symbolic change is much more strongly identified with a desire for legitimacy. A 
number of studies have been done in studying the implementation of organisational 
strategies and symbolic changes are found in the process of implementing strategies for 
legitimacy purpose (Edelman, Abraham, & Erlanger, 1992; Westphal & Zajac, 1998). 
An illustration of such a desire is exemplified in Brunsson and Olsen (1993)’s study of 
Swedish Rail. It was found that management reform strategies were formally 
implemented without any impact on daily operations. It emerged that the reforms 
required the collaboration of various operational departments who accordingly 
collaborated as long as the reforms did not affect their work in any significant way. 
Thus, symbolic strategies have the feature of bearing little impact on production 
activities.  
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In the same vein, Meyer (2008) point out, national states promote world norms with 
which they have no capacity or will to implement. Similarly, Brunsson (1989) observes 
there is often within institutions a contrast between policy talk and practical action. 
What is called “loose coupling” is a source of considerable tension. It arises when 
powerful and interested actors create rules and processes in institutions. Within 
institutional theory, researchers refer to the concept of decoupling. Decoupling within 
institutions takes the form of ceremonial activities, which seem to be important and 
agreeable to the actors involved but do not add anything to efficiency of production. 
The productive function may be hard to differentiate from the ceremonial, as the 
decoupling of the symbolic from the substantive is often veiled under a cloak of acting. 
All actors participate in decoupling. As Meyer (2008) comments: 
Modern organisations and national states appear to be eager to 
construct themselves as actors thus incorporating, often wholesale, 
global standards. In an expanding world society, people and groups 
everywhere seem eager to be actors – this often takes precedence 
over other goals and can produce assertions of actor identity far from 
any actor capability. People, in short, may put more effort into being 
actors than into acting. (p. 801)   
Governments such as Romania may have put more effort into being actors than acting. 
As Albu et al. (2011) point out, Romania quickly adopted the IFRS but failed to 
implement substantive change. Likewise, the Greek government has been coerced into 
legislating reforms aimed at reducing expenditure; however, the desired savings have 
been heavily diluted in the process of implementation, much to the concern of the 
European lenders (The Economist, 2012). The literature draws attention to a possible 
disjunction within institutions which occurs when senior management introduces 
substantive changes, which are then only partially, or sometimes not at all, 
implemented by the staff concerned with operations (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975; 
Hasselbladh & Kallinikos, 2000; Perrow, 1970; Thompson, 1967/2003). There are 
some indirect references to this disjunction in the literature with regard to governments 
but none with regard to specific professions (Scott, 2008; Streeck & Schmitter, 1985). 
Moreover, in respect of governments, professions and individual actors, the question of 
how such disjunctions occur while seeking legitimacy is not addressed. It is this gap in 
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the literature that the paper seeks to address.  
3. Research Design 
The main evidence of this research paper was collected by using semi-structured 
interviews. Informal conversations were also conducted with a number of interview 
participants prior to the formal semi-structured interviews to increase the salience and 
relevance of interview questions (Patton, 2002). By analysing the responses from the 
informal conversations, lines of inquiry can be developed and modified to ensure that 
more relevant and important questions are asked in the formal interviews. Follow-up 
phone calls were made after some of the interviews. The purpose of the follow-up 
phone calls is to clarify unclear responses from the interviewees. As shown in Table 2, 
thirty-five participants were purposefully selected for in-depth interviews.  
 
Table 2 Summary of Interviews, Information Conversations and Follow-up Phone 
Calls 
Groups of Interviewees 
(Refer to section 5.4.2) 
Number of 
Interviews  
Number of 
Informal 
Conversations 
Number of 
Follow-Up Phone 
Calls 
1. Key personnel from relevant 
government agencies in China 
4 0 2 
2. Key personnel from CPA Australia 6 7 4 
3. Senior accountants in China 16 4 3 
4. Chinese accounting academics 9 0 4 
Total 35 11 13 
 
In addition to semi-structured interviews, this study also involved analysing documents 
from a wide range of sources, in particular a systematic analysis of government 
resources (such as the National People’s Congress and Ministry of Finance) and 
websites (such as the CICPA, ACCA and CPA Australia sites) that relate to the entry of 
western professional accounting bodies into China. As Bryman and Bell (2011) suggest, 
a government is the source of an extensive amount of information of potential 
significance for researchers. They add that a government is the source of much textual 
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material of potential interest, such as acts, legislation and official reports (Bryman & 
Bell, 2011).  
 
4. Findings and Discussion 
4.1 Research Question One: Isomorphic responses 
Much of the theoretical argument centres on an explanation by way of coercive 
isomorphism, that is, an alliance of westernised global bodies (the World Bank, the 
WTO, the IMF, the IASB, the Big 4 accounting firms, MNEs and so forth) had a 
significant impact on the Chinese government. Sauddagaran (2004), Doupnik and 
Perera (2007), and Antwi (2009) agree that there is a global process of accounting 
colonialism taking place whereby governments are subjected to pressures from 
international bodies to adopt what is largely a system designed and developed for 
western countries. To an extent the findings of this paper support these arguments but 
not without some contradictions. The government officials interviewed were 
unanimous in declaring that coercive exogenous forces would not sway the Chinese 
government into accepting western accounting practices. It should be observed that 
such government officials are likely to be party members and to share a more Maoist 
than a liberal outlook. By contrast, most of the accountants interviewed held that such 
foreign influences did have a coercive impact on China. In particular, an academic 
researcher who was involved in the initial stage of IFRS convergence project pointed 
out that China has been forced by external pressures to converge with the IFRS: 
From my point of view, China converged with the IFRS because of 
external pressure. First, the EU adopted the IFRS and required all 
listed companies to adopt it. China noted this and realised that it had 
to use the same accounting system if it wanted to communicate with 
the rest of the world. Second, MNEs lobbied the Chinese government 
to converge with the IFRS so that their financial reporting costs 
could be reduced. These MNEs can be very influential and persuasive. 
(Interview: Participant 21) 
This paper finds that the Chinese government converged with the IFRS in response to 
demands from MNEs operating in China. China’s accounting system was not 
re-established until 1993 and largely followed the Soviet model, which was in many 
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ways not able to support the rapid economic growth of the country. Except for the Big 4 
firms, there were no accounting firms capable of preparing audits according to 
international standards. This is also confirmed by Irvine and Lucas (2006), who argue 
that countries lacking expertise in standard-setting and facing pressures from 
international corporations are likely to adopt the IFRS. Similar claims of coercive 
influence by the international institutional bodies can also be found in other research 
studies (Chamisa, 2000; Irvine & Lucas, 2006; Mir & Rahaman, 2005). 
What is also persuasive in arguing that coercive isomorphism was a major factor in 
China welcoming western accounting firms and professional accounting bodies is the 
current push-back referred to by some interviewees, whereby the Big 4 firms are 
becoming less welcome. According to an Accounting Professor: 
Every country protects itself. For instance, the US will not allow 
Chinese accounting firms to audit American banks. Japan does not 
welcome the Big 4 and therefore imposes regulations and controls 
over their operations in Japan. If you take a look at the accounting 
service industry in Japan, there are over 50,000 accounting firms and 
those large Japanese corporations are audited by local accounting 
firms… we are similarly concerned about our economy in terms of 
information safety. We also need to protect our accounting service 
industry. Every country is concerned about its own interests. 
(Interview: Participant 9) 
The intrusion of these western accounting firms is now being seen as a threat to 
information secrecy and national security in China. As part of such a push-back, the 
Chinese government recently issued a Big 4 domesticating policy which aims to 
increase the number of domestic Chinese partners who hold a CICPA qualification and 
Chinese nationality in the Big 4 accounting firms (Ministry of Finance, 2012). However, 
a senior consultant from one of the Big 4 in China considers that these regulations will 
not work effectively:  
These non-Chinese partners can live with the new policy and they 
will find a way to get around it. These requirements are quite 
symbolic because audit reports are signed by local Chinese auditors 
and partners but these non-Chinese partners are in charge and earn 
the highest salaries. (Interview: Participant 34) 
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This coercive effect on the Chinese government has been discussed above with 
reference to the literature. Another aspect of coercive isomorphism, which has been 
demonstrated by this study, is the absolute power of the Chinese government in the 
administration and operation of the Chinese professional accounting body – the CICPA. 
This paper found that the CICPA, which is the only legally recognised professional 
accounting body in China, is strongly controlled by the Ministry of Finance. Participant 
10 explained: 
CICPA does not have the authority to exercise power in many aspects; 
for instance they can only issue warnings to accountants who breach 
the codes of practice. CICPA has to refer cases of serious 
non-compliance to the Ministry of Finance as this is out of the 
CICPA’s hands. According to the Law of the People’s Republic of 
China for Certified Public Accountants, the Ministry of Finance has 
the authority to punish accountants for their breaches of the codes of 
practice, impose financial penalties, cancel registrations, as well as 
approve CPA firms’ registrations and licences. (Interview: 
Participant 10) 
It has become apparent that the Chinese accounting profession is relatively weak and 
dependent for legal direction on the Chinese government. By contrast, the accounting 
profession in common-law countries such as the UK and the US has been independent 
and relatively strong from a very early stage of its development (Perera, 1989). Ding, 
Hope, Jeanjean and Stolowy (2007) point out that in many communist and 
ex-communist countries with relatively weak accounting professions, accounting 
standards normally follow a rule-based compliance model, which is less sophisticated 
and less comprehensive. While acknowledging that substance over form is a concept 
that relies heavily on professional judgment, these researchers also asserted that their 
rule-based systems do not facilitate a change to a principle-based model. Albu et al. 
(2011) agree with Ding et al. (2007) and show that the ex-communist country Romania 
adopted western accounting practices largely as a matter of necessity rather than choice 
and has since done nothing to enforce them.  
As discussed previously in this section, it is argued that China’s convergence with 
international accounting standards is strongly influenced by the western international 
institutions. China’s situation is similar to Romania’s as its convergence is a matter of 
necessity rather than choice. However, China differs from these ex-communist 
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countries studied in the literature in that the Chinese government has been very 
supportive of the convergence and has made many substantive efforts to implement it. 
This paper found that the majority of the Chinese government officials, accountants and 
academic researchers interviewed believe that convergence with international 
accounting standards was welcomed in China. However, because of China’s different 
social, economic, political and cultural environments, they considered full adoption 
would be a step too far and not likely to happen in the near future. As Participant 10 
admitted:  
China’s accounting standards are an important part of Chinese law. 
Because they are a part of our law, they need to be written in Chinese. 
We have to convert the IFRS to standards that we can understand 
and apply in China. We promise that we will continue converging 
with the IFRS. (Interview: Participant 10) 
As Participant 11 also expressed in a colourful way: 
Even though we are learning from the West, we cannot blindly mimic 
everything from the West. We hope to preserve our traditions which 
suit the development of the accounting industry in our 
country…Those we borrowed from the West are not practical, 
because they can only prosper and develop after being 
localised…using a metaphor, two months ago I bought a plant which 
can only grow in the South. It was October in Beijing and it was quite 
cold. The plant was about to blossom when I bought it; however, 
because of the change in environment, all the petals fell off. Then like 
something reborn, the plant localised itself and there were new petals 
coming out. (Interview: Participant 11) 
It was also admitted that there are still quite a few differences in practice between the 
Chinese accounting standards and the international accounting standards. As a senior 
accountant who recently gained a western professional accounting membership 
admitted: 
In the past, I always thought that there was not much difference 
between Chinese accounting standards and the IFRS as China has 
been converging with the IFRS. However, after completing the 
[western] professional programme, I realised that there are quite a 
few differences in many aspects. Convergence does not mean Chinese 
standards and the IFRS are almost the same. Certainly there are still 
quite a few differences in practice. (Interview: Participant 12) 
Therefore, it seems that coercive isomorphism has more influence than mimetic 
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isomorphism in the case of the Chinese government, even though Westney (1987) 
points out that Japan’s 19th century modernisers provide a model for governments to 
learn and adopt what is best from foreign sources. Several researchers (Callao, Jarne, & 
Laı´nez, 2007; Hoogendoorn, 2006; Jermakowicz & Gornik-Tomaszewski, 2006; 
Larson & Street, 2004; Schipper, 2005; Tokar, 2005; Vellam, 2004) give various 
reasons why mimetic isomorphism in code-law and communist coutries is not likely to 
produce a faithful representation. Albu et al. (2011) argue that de facto application of 
the IFRS is limited by the differences in cultural, political and social environments. The 
government officials argued that blindly mimicking the practices of the West will not 
work for the Chinese accounting system. Many of the interviewees rejected the concept 
of copying, preferring to offer the reponse of being open to new learning or that of 
making future mutual recognition more likely.  
In particular, the government officials talked of establishing a gold standard for 
accounting, which combines the best of the West with Chinese practices and seems to 
appeal to a Platonic (or perhaps Confucian) ideal. March and Olsen (1976) argue that 
mimicking could occur unintentionally; therefore such talk of a gold standard does 
admit some mimetic influence because organisations tend to model or adopt practices 
from similar organisations in the field that they perceive as more legitimate or 
successful (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). In this case, the western practices were 
accepted by most of the interviewees as more legitimate internationally.  
The findings in connection with normative isomorphic influences revealed a rift in 
officialdom between liberalising officials, often those with overseas experience, and 
more Maoist officials. The case of the Shenzhen economic zone was cited by 
interviewees. In this case, two well-known former vice presidents of the Ministry of 
Finance in China can be considered institutional entrepreneurs because they dislodged 
existing practices, and introduced new ones (Hardy & Maguire, 2008). The former is 
regarded as the more liberalising official as he has overseas experience and granted 
independence to the Shenzhen branch of the CICPA, whereas the latter is regarded as 
the more Maoist official who strengthened the power of the central government by 
revoking the legislative power granted by her predecessor to the Shenzhen branch. 
According to Participant 32: 
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The CICPA office in Shenzhen special economic zone was very 
special at that time. They had law-making authority. Similar to 
HKICPA, they had administrative authority to impose penalties, 
administer registrations and so forth. They had the 1995 
Administrative Regulations of Shenzhen Special Economic Zone on 
Certified Public Accountants, which gave the Shenzhen CICPA office 
legislative power to regulate the accounting profession in Shenzhen. 
(Interview: Participant 32) 
The grant and removal of the independent governance of the Shenzhen branch of the 
CICPA support the findings of the literature (Fligstein, 1991; Greenwood & Hinings, 
1996; Jaffee, 2001) in the sense that the top government officials in China have the 
ability to alter the rules and exercise agency power to influence or change the 
environment and structural constraints. In this case, the rules referred to are the 
administrative regulations of the Shenzhen branch of the CICPA (Standing Committee 
of Shenzhen Municipal People’s Congress, 1995, 2003). This demonstrates that 
although normative influences can be effective they are variable as government 
officials change positions. These individual influences are referred as institutional 
entrepreneurship (DiMaggio, 1988; Fligstein, 1991; Hardy, Maguire, & Lawrence, 
2004; Leblebici, Salancik, Copay, & King, 1991). The findings of this paper support the 
literature by putting human agency back into the institutional analysis of organisations. 
The importance of individual actors is underlined by Scott (2003) in terms of how their 
energy, their ideas, their conformity or nonconformity shape and constitute the 
structure of an organisation.  
Another aspect of normative influences relates to which international body China 
should be most influenced by. Several interviewees make reference to the global 
accounting alliance (GAA) without being familiar with any specific members of the 
alliance. They are, however, aware that the ICAEW and the HKICPA are members of 
this alliance and that the ACCA and CPA Australia are not (GAA, 2013). For reasons 
not fully explained, the GAA is seen as the gold standard. The officials interviewed 
hold the view that the CICPA is more like the ICAEW than other accounting bodies: 
“CICPA is the professional accounting body in China, it is more similar to the chartered 
accountants’ organisations” (Participant 10). In terms of collaboration with members of 
GAA, currently, there is an arrangement whereby members of the ICAEW and the 
HKICPA can apply for mutual recognition with the CICPA by completing only two 
 18 
papers: law and taxation (CICPA, 2013). According to the participants interviewed, this 
is the best exemption that China has been given and reflects the high value that China 
puts on the GAA. The interviewee also recognises that the ACCA and CPA Australia do 
not belong to GAA.  
It is quite obvious in Hong Kong that if an accountant has the ACCA 
qualification and wants to apply for HKICPA membership, he probably 
needs to take a few more exams. The same conditions apply to CPA 
Australia members as well. They are obviously in a different circle 
[network]. This may be because of history or is a reflection of the 
current status. (Interview: Participant 11) 
An audit partner of an international accounting firm also confirmed the ICAEW as “the 
gold standard”. He explained: 
When I speak to the people in this profession, most of them know about 
ICAEW and they recognise that as being “the gold standard” – if you 
translate, it means the content of the gold is “the most prestigious” in 
other words. They know it and recognise that as well. (Interview: 
Participant 16) 
According to Scott (2003) such norms of the notional gold standard are internalised by 
social actors. They are guided by a sense of what is appropriate, by their obligations to 
others, and by a commitment to common values. While this normative commitment to 
welcoming a foreign professional accounting body was widely acknowledged by 
interviewees, it did not extend to the ACCA and even less to CPA Australia. In 
particular, interviewees saw the ACCA as a training institution rather than a 
professional accounting body. What is worse for CPA Australia is that most 
interviewees saw CPA Australia as an inferior version of the ICAEW. Somehow these 
overseas professional accounting bodies have been ranked as to their value to China. 
4.2 Research Question Two: Symbolic or substantive legitimising strategies 
The last aspect concerns whether the Chinese government is seeking legitimacy for the 
Chinese accounting profession in the international accounting arena by adopting either 
a symbolic or substantive organisational legitimising strategy, or a combination of both. 
It was drawn from the interview findings that accountants and academics are 
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unanimously agreed that it is in the interests of the country to have an increasing 
number of Chinese CPAs holding western professional accounting qualifications. The 
Chinese government officials agreed with this view, especially as it relates to the 
importance of further developing the Chinese accounting profession on a global scale. 
In particular, the officials interviewed were all very proud of China’s stronger voice 
internationally. The findings of this paper suggest that the Chinese government is 
willing to seek legitimacy in the eyes of the world and powerful international 
institutions such as the IASB. Both the convergence with the IFRS and welcoming 
western professional accounting bodies to operate in China can be considered strategies 
to gain legitimacy. These legitimising strategies are self-interested and are defined by 
Suchman (1995) as being pragmatic in nature. Aldrich & Fiol (1994) point out that for 
self-interested reasons organisations may emphasise their image and legitimise such an 
image and reputation by advertising and, in the case of China, by being seen in the eyes 
of western accounting professionals through the western professional accounting 
bodies. Symbolic strategies concern image and reputation, whereas substantive 
strategies are more about functionality and operation. Many researchers refer to 
substantive legitimating techniques when institutions make changes to outputs, 
methods of operation and goals, or make changes in terms of technical processes or 
efficiency (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975; Okike, 2004).  
Carruthers (1995) suggests that an organisation’s legitimising strategies may not 
necessarily be substantive. To acquire legitimacy, an organisation can detach its formal 
structures and procedures from everyday practices – this is known as decoupling and 
symbolic window-dressing (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Observations have been made by 
many researchers that organisations play active roles in shaping their institutional 
contexts; however, such symbolic strategies largely result in ceremonial change rather 
than substantive improvement in technical efficiency (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975; Parson, 
1956; Perrow, 1970; Thompson, 1967/2003).  
 
The findings of this paper reveal that some decoupling happens in both China’s 
convergence with the IFRS and China’s welcome of western professional accounting 
bodies. First, with regard to China’s convergence with the IFRS, many previous studies 
have found that convergence of institutional systems across different cultural, social 
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and political environments is not easily achieved except possibly in a symbolic rather 
than a substantive sense (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; Brunsson, 1989; Brunsson & 
Olsen, 1993; Fiss, 2008; Fiss & Zajac, 2004; Jackson & Moerke, 2005; Meyer, 2008). 
The finding concurs with the literature in that Chinese culture and standards still prevail 
and therefore full adoption of the IFRS seems unlikely in the near future. This is 
because China’s system of governance has evolved in response to its unique political, 
historical and cultural environments (Lockett, 1988; Tricker, 1990). Tensions can arise 
as western thinking is very different from eastern thinking (Hofstede & Bond, 1988). 
The persistence of national systems alongside the convergence process is found in 
many developing countries (Allen, 2005; Miller & O'Leary, 1987). Evidence of such 
persistence has also been found in the responses of the majority of interviewees in this 
study. Therefore, it is concluded on the basis of the interview and documentary data 
collected and analysed that China’s adoption of the IFRS is likely to be in a symbolic 
rather than a substantive form. The intention of the Chinese government to adopt the 
IFRS could be merely a symbolic strategy to legitimise China in the eyes of the western 
accounting profession.  
Second, even though the CICPA’s joint training programmes with many western 
professional accounting bodies can be considered substantive strategies, the 
willingness to further collaborate with the ICAEW and the HKICPA may be seen as a 
more symbolic move for legitimising in the eyes of the world. Collaboration with a 
prestigious western professional accounting body can be considered an effective form 
of symbolic advertising to legitimise the image and the reputation of the Chinese 
accounting profession. Therefore, the constant reference by interviewees to the gold 
standard of professional accounting membership may be seen as driven more by 
symbolic than by substantive legitimising strategies.   
5. Conclusion  
To conclude the paper, the key finding of this paper is that a degree of international 
coercion has been involved. Even though the coercive exogenous influences were 
denied or ignored by the government officials interviewed, it should be noted that these 
officials were likely to be defensive and not open to questioning they saw as intrusive 
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as they were Communist Party members. Not surprisingly, the Chinese accountants and 
accounting academics interviewed, who were more likely to be open to such 
questioning, believed there was strong evidence that coercive forces have been 
influential. Coercive influences from the international accounting institutional network 
– the MNEs – were also found to be a major factor in China’s convergence with the 
IFRS. However, China has been reluctant to go further than a promise of convergence 
with the IFRS because of its different social, economic, political and cultural 
environments. Therefore, it was the agreed view of the interviewees that blindly 
mimicking practices from the west will not work for the Chinese accounting system.  
More recently, the intrusion of the western accounting institutions has been seen as a 
threat to China’s information secrecy and national security. As a result, there are signs 
of a push-back against the operations of the international accounting organisations in 
the Chinese market. Signs of this push-back are the debate between the Chinese 
government and the PCAOB in the US about Longtop audit work, and the 
domesticating policy concerning the Big 4 accounting firms. The Chinese 
government’s push-back activities and its absolute power in the governance of the 
Chinese professional accounting body (CICPA) are evidence of China’s coercive power 
in the local accounting field. However, such coercive power was found to be limited 
when compared with the influence of western institutions.   
Normative isomorphic influences can also be observed in China. Top Chinese 
government officials such as the Vice President of the Ministry of Finance have been 
found to be institutional entrepreneurs who can exercise their normative powers to 
change rules in the accounting field. However, it was also observed that such individual 
influences are variable and constrained as a result of the strong oversight and coercive 
power of the Chinese government. Another aspect of normative isomorphism widely 
acknowledged by interviewees was that the ICAEW represents a professional ideal at 
which China should aim. However, such a normative commitment to welcoming a 
western professional accounting body does not extend to either the ACCA or CPA 
Australia. It was observed in this study that the western professional accounting bodies 
have become ranked according to their value to Chinese accountants.  
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The last issue raised by the second research question concerns the organisational 
legitimising strategies adopted by the Chinese government in seeking legitimacy for 
the Chinese accounting profession. It emerged from the findings of this study that both 
the convergence with the IFRS and the welcoming of western professional accounting 
bodies into China can be considered legitimising strategies. However, such legitimising 
strategies are not necessarily substantive in nature as some decoupling is evident in the 
findings. The persistence of a national system alongside the convergence process has 
been revealed by this study. Consistent with the literature, China’s adoption of the IFRS 
cannot be easily achieved except possibly in a symbolic sense because of differences in 
the cultural, social and political environments. On the other hand, the CICPA’s 
collaboration with the ICAEW – which interviewees constantly referred to as “the gold 
standard” – can be considered an effective symbolic strategy to legitimise the Chinese 
accounting profession in the eyes of the western accounting profession.  
China is a growing world power and may well have the world’s largest economy in the 
future. How China operates in the accounting field will have far-reaching ramifications 
for the rest of the world. Chinese participation in IFRS adoption and collaborations 
with western accounting profession can promote the further globalisation of accounting. 
Whereas Chinese resistance to globalisation could arise because China feels its voice in 
international organisations, professions, and accounting education is being undervalued. 
The extent of China’s participation or resistance will be of great significance in seeking 
the ideal of accounting globalisation. The findings of this research reveal the impact of 
the western institutional network on China and the limited coercive power that China 
has imposed on these institutions. The study raises important implications and 
contributes to the history of the Anglo-Saxon accounting profession and its move into 
overseas countries. The paper also makes a contribution to knowledge through the 
application of NIS theory to the field of the accounting profession. 
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